INTRODUCTION
Work and the workplace itself have long been recognized as conferring important benefits on workers and society at large.' For workers, work provides a source of income and may provide a sense of self-worth and fulfillment, and the workplace itself may be a source of community. 2 For society, full or maximized employment provides a source of social stability and control, and also fuels the economy. 3 Congress skeptical of and less receptive to such claims.? And, while the above-described impairments may themselves impede or prevent a worker from working, those same impairments may have a substantially adverse-indeed, sometimes debilitating-impact on other, more fundamental, basic life functions, including breathing, eating, and sleeping, among others."o Thus, a day seldom goes by without a report of toxic mold in a workplace causing life-threatening respiratory or neurological problems for employees," or excessively stressful circumstances or relationships at work causing equally lifeimpacting mental illness. 12 This Article will address judicial treatment of one aspect of the toxic workplace under the ADA and Section 504.13 Specifically, it will address a line of cases under the ADA holding that, where an impairment is caused solely by the work environment and substantially limits major life activities other than working, the question of whether a worker is disabled within the meaning of the ADA must be evaluated under so-called foreclosure or class-based analysis. Foreclosure/class-based analysis requires that a worker's
Id.
9. See infra note 92. 10. See supra note 8. 11. See, e.g., Other Sick Building Stories, SICK BUILDINGS AND TOXIC MOLD, www.presenting.net/sbs/otherstories.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) .
12. See, e.g., Facts about Workplace Stress, MEDI-SMART: NURSING EDUCATION RESOURCES, www.medi-smart.com/stressl.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) .
13. Toxic workplaces include work environments that expose workers to dangerous substances, fumes, or the like. See Michelle Gorton, Comment. Intentional Disregard: Remedies for the Toxic Workplace, 30 ENVTL. L. 811 (2000) .
Toxic workplaces, however, also include work environments characterized by dysfunctional relationships between employees and management that can lead to stress and thereby cause or exacerbate mental or physical illness. 223-24 (1997) , this Article will primarily focus on the idiosyncratically-toxic workplace, i.e. workplaces where individual employees have particular susceptibility to workplace-caused impairments. impairment prevent him or her from performing a broad range or class of jobs. Traditionally, this doctrine applies only when the single major life activity affected is working. Ultimately, this Article will reject the holding in those cases.
Part I of the Article will discuss existing ADA and Section 504 doctrine, outlining the statutory texts, federal case law, and Congressional intent, thereby providing the framework for traditional disability discrimination analysis. Part II will discuss the line of cases alluded to above, tracking the courts' deviation from traditional analysis. 1 5 Part III will critique that case law, demonstrating that the courts' focus on causation (a) runs contrary to Congressional intent and that the resultant use of foreclosure/class-based analysis contravenes Supreme Court precedent, (b) is illogical and improperly requires additional issues of proof, and (c) by unwarrantedly making it more difficult for an employee to prove disability, and by thereby potentially eliminating inquiry into the issue of whether the employer might be able to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability, prematurely truncates ADA and Section 504 analysis. 6 Part IV of this Article will place that line of cases in the larger context of ADA and Section 504 jurisprudence. Specifically, Part IV will argue that such cases are symptomatic of the courts' desire to maintain "gate keeper" status on disability discrimination claims by (a) resolving such cases in favor of employers on the threshold issue of whether a claimant is disabled as a matter of law at summary judgment, and (b) thereby improperly failing to give full play to the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA and Section 504, which often involve questions of fact not susceptible to summary judgment and questions of management prerogative regarding the internal operation of its business." The Article will conclude by suggesting that, because judicial analysis in this area has been at odds with both previously-and recentlystated congressional intent and existing Supreme Court precedent, the appropriate fix should come from future judicial decisions, not Congress. ' To prove a claim under the ADA, an employee must prove that he or she (1) is disabled under the Act, (2) is a qualified individual with a disability, and (3) has been discriminated against because of the disability.
2 4 The analysis is essentially the same under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, with an employee also having to prove that the employer receives federal funding. A major life activity must be of "comparative importance" and "central to the life process itself" and it need not have a "public, economic, or daily character." hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating and working." 34 This statutory amendment codified a number of judicial decisions that had held that several fundamental activities, not specifically listed in the regulations implementing the ADA, constituted major life activities under the ADA. 5 Given the broad range of ADA-cognizable major life activities falling outside the context of working, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion "that the question of whether an impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the effect of the impairment in the workplace. buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that the ADA's definition of disability applies to public transportation and privately-provided public accommodation cases, in addition to employment cases, stating that the ADA "is intended to cover individuals with disabling impairments regardless of whether the individuals have any connection to a workplace."'
In employment cases, the Supreme Court and numerous other courts have held that, when the major life activity affected by the impairment is working, a "foreclosure" or class-based test must be applied. Thus, when working is the major life activity affected by the impairment, "the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires ... that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs" or in a "'broad range' of jobs, rather than a specific job."" Conversely, where an impairment affects a major life activity other than working, the Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor Mfg., made clear that working need not be analyzed in ADA employment cases and specifically held that " [n] Although it is questionable whether [plaintiffl could state a claim with respect to the major life activity of 'working' because he does not specifically allege he was regarded as 'unable to work in a broad class of jobs,' the court need not decide this question at this stage, since he has also included allegations that he was regarded as substantially impaired in other major activities such as "learning."
Id. (citation omitted); see also (2001) ("[Djue to the difficult evidentiary standard in cases involving the major life activity of working, many future plaintiffs will need to bring claims based on other major life activities that have been successful in the wake of Sutton."). Congress, albeit indirectly, essentially codified these well-established principles of ADA law in the ADAAA, enacting a rule of construction which states that "[an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C). suggesting that its protection is limited to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to his or her impairment." 4 2
Courts and commentators have reached the same conclusion regarding the etiology of physical and mental impairments, stating that "[tihe ADA and regulations under it are simply devoid of any requirement that a physiological disorder or condition have a scientific name or known etiology," 43 and that "the key in psychiatric disability cases-as in all other disability casesis to look at the manifestations of disability rather than the etiology of the disability."' Indeed, in at least three federal or state law disability discrimination cases where employees alleged that their employer caused their impairments, the courts refused to evaluate causation for purposes of disability discrimination analysis, stating in the most recent decision that "[p]laintiffs status as a qualified individual with a disability does not depend on the cause of his disability, but on the extent of his disability."
Although Congress, courts, and commentators have not directly addressed the issue, the congressional and judicial refusal to allow or to require inquiry into the cause of an impairment appears to stem from their reluctance to (1) (further) complicate ADA and Section 504 cases with additional issues of proof,
46
(2) bring tort concepts of causation into federal statutes designed, not to compensate plaintiffs for personal injury, but to allow qualified individuals to enter or remain in the workforce, 47 and (3) based on the ADA and Section 504's statuses as civil rights statutes, to avoid potentially "re-victimizing" individuals previously and traditionally subject to discrimination. 4 8 As to this latter point, just as Congress and the courts would not countenance employer or judicial inquiry into how an individual became a member of a protected class-indeed, such inquiry would be absurd in cases involving immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity and age, among others-Congress and the courts have wisely chosen not to open that area of inquiry in disability discrimination cases either.
D. Qualified Individuals, Reasonable Accommodation, and Undue Hardship
Once a court determines that an individual is disabled under the ADA or Section 504, the court looks to whether the person is a qualified individual under the two federal statutes. Under the ADA and Section 504, a qualified individual includes "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 4 9 Under the ADA's implementing regulations, "[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires."5o Under the ADA and Section 504, a reasonable accommodation may include "reassignment to a vacant position,"" a transfer, 52 54 Where, however, a court finds and concludes that an employee is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, it need not reach the issue of whether the employer failed to provide the employee with a reasonable accommodation. 5 In sum, (1) ADA and Section 504 doctrine protects individuals afflicted with physical or mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities, (2) only the major life activity of working triggers class-based analysis, (3) the cause of an impairment is irrelevant to ADA and Section 504 analysis, and (4) once an individual is recognized as disabled under the ADA and Section 504, all that should matter is whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the position that he or she holds or seeks, with or without a reasonable accommodation from his or her employer. claims, an ADA claim against her former employer, a financial institution that had been placed in receivership.1 7
II. THE CASES
The district court rejected Rhoads's ADA claim on crossmotions for summary judgment, rejecting the claim that she was disabled because her physical impairments substantially limited her major life activities of working and breathing." Thus, as to Rhoads's working claim, the court stated as follows:
In this case, plaintiff alleges that she was unable to work in a smoke-filled environment due to the effect smoke had on her breathing and headaches. However, there appears to be no reasonable material or relevant factual dispute concerning the plaintiffs ability to perform her job requirements at a very high level, provided that she is given the opportunity to perform her work in a smoke-free atmosphere . . . . Thus, applying the . . . foreclosure test,
Rhoads cannot argue that a class of jobs free from exposure to smoke has been foreclosed as a result of her impairments, and hence, Rhoads cannot show her ability to work is substantially limited. Consequently, as Rhoads's strongest claim of substantial impairment to a major life activity, i.e., her ability to work, fails, Rhoads's claim that she has a disability is fatally weakened. The district court also rejected Rhoads's breathing claim, again applying the foreclosure test and stating as follows:
The plaintiff, however, strenuously argues application of the foreclosure test to her claim is only a starting point for determining whether or not she is a disabled individual because she alleges additional major life activities, such as breathing, are affected by the asthma and migraines she suffers when exposed to smoke. 
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[Vol:51 subsided, she continued to have problems working and breathing at her prior worksite, where, according to her supervisor, a significant number of "workshops, meetings, and programmatic activities" within her job assignment occurred.' As in Rhoads, the district court granted summary judgment in LLNL's favor, finding and concluding that because Benson only had difficulty breathing at.one worksite, but was not foreclosed from working (and breathing) at a broad class of job, she was not impaired in the major life activity of working." The district court, quoting the district court's opinion in Rhoads, likewise rejected Benson's contention that she was impaired in the major life activity of breathing." Thus, as in Rhoads, the court held that where an employee's impairment is triggered solely by her workplace environment, the foreclosure analysis applicable to the major life activity of working must inform the court's conclusion." And, the district court rejected Benson's argument that her breathing impairment was caused, at least in part, by factors outside her workplace, finding and concluding that Benson "ha [d] not offered evidence to show that her symptoms were triggered by anything but her work environment.""
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in an unpublished opinion."
The Court of Appeals did so without citing or discussing the district court's opinion in Rhoads."
In the only relevant Court of Appeals decision post-dating the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rhoads, the Ninth Circuit addressed the legal effect of impairments caused by working conditions that limit both working and other major life activities." In Tyler, the plaintiff was bitten by an insect nesting near the distribution center of his employer, Target 
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The Court of Appeals concluded by opining that Congress did not intend for the ADA to cover employees in Tyler's circumstances, stating:
The ADA protects people whose disability precludes them from working in a broad class of jobs. While the allergic reactions Tyler endured were serious, we cannot say he was disabled under the ADA where the impairment is the result of working at one place during one period of time. If this were the kind of disability that Congress really meant to redress, it could do so in future amendments to the statute. The precedents that constrain our consideration do not in the meantime permit an extension of the ADA's protections here. Until this legal landscape shifts, we must affirm the district court's ruling in favor of Target. Thus, under the legal standard applied in each of the above-discussed decisions, ADA plaintiffs were forced to either suffer physically in the workplace or quit their jobs, rather than receive accommodations from their employers." 79. The legal standard applied clearly affected the results of these cases. The decisions may also be partly attributable to the unique facts in the cases, a mischaracterization of the facts and the plaintiffs' claim by the courts, or bad tactical decisions by the plaintiffs (or some combination thereof). In each of the cases, the courts found that plaintiffs' impairments were triggered by air quality and other conditions solely in their respective workplaces. However, the courts' findings seem highly suspect, given that the impairments allegedasthma and allergies-could almost certainly be caused by conditions outside of the workplace as well-such as bars or nightclubs where smoking has not been banned by state law or local ordinance (an increasingly infrequent circumstance in many parts of the United States), or churches burning incense as part of their religious practice. Indeed, in each of the cases, the plaintiffs argued or presented evidence that their impairments were also triggered by nonworkplace conditions. In each instance, however, the courts chose to ignore the plaintiffs' factual showing or characterized it as inadequate. Also, as discussed above, given that the plaintiffs' impairments substantially limited their major life activities other than working, and given that "working" cases are analyzed under the employer-favoring class-based test, the plaintiffs in Rhoads and Tyler would have been better served-and would have been less likely to have led the III. CRITIQUE
A. Utilizing Foreclosure /Class-Based Analysis when an Impairment is Caused or Exacerbated by the Work Environment and Substantially Affects Major Life Activities other than Working is Contrary to Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Case Law
As discussed above, Congress, in enacting both the ADA and Section 504, expressly stated that the cause or etiology of an impairment is of no legal moment under either of those federal disability discrimination statutes.
80 Notwithstanding Congress's clear statement of legislative intent, Rhoads and its progeny hold that the foreclosure test must be applied to disability discrimination plaintiffs' claims when their impairment is caused solely by the work environment." By so holding, those courts, with no indication that they are consciously doing so, have acted directly contrary to congressional intent and have carved out a category of cases where causation improperly matters. 82. It might be argued that Congress's determination that causation is irrelevant in disability discrimination cases was an attempt to ensure that impairments caused by voluntary (albeit, in some cases, addiction-based) conduct-e.g., lung cancer caused by cigarette smoking or morbid obesity caused by overeating-do not receive protection under the ADA and Section 504. However, the House Report, discussing impairments and major life activities under the ADA, stated as follows:
... [Ihf a person is employed as a painter and is assigned to work with a unique paint which caused severe allergies, such as skin rashes or seizures, the person would be substantially limited in a major life activity, by virtue of the resulting skin disease or seizure disorder. The cause of a disability is always irrelevant to the determination of disability. In such a case, a reasonable accommodation to the employee may include assignment to other areas where the particular paint is not used. In addition, the Rhoads line of cases, by evaluating impairments triggered or exacerbated by the work environment under the foreclosure test when the impairment substantially limits major life activities other than working, ignores well-settled Supreme Court and lower court precedent related to analyzing the effect of impairments on major life activities.' As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held that class-based analysis does not apply when an impairment substantially affects a major life activity other than working.' Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding, numerous lower courts and the EEOC have made clear that, where an ADA or Section 504 plaintiff has demonstrated that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity other than or more fundamental than working, the effect of the impairment on working-and, in turn, the question of whether the impairment prevents the plaintiff from working in a broad range of jobs-should not be analyzed." Thus, with essentially no analysis, Rhoads and its progeny blithely ignore Congressional intent concerning the causation issue, as well as ignore Supreme Court and lower court authority regarding the circumscribed roles of working as a major life activity and foreclosure/class-based analysis in ADA and Section 504 jurisprudence." . Thus, the House Report makes clear that Congress, in discussing the irrelevance of causation, was referring to the relationship between the work environment and an ADA-and Section 504-cognizable impairment, and not between voluntary conduct and impairment. For a discussion regarding assessing voluntary conduct under the ADA, see Lisa E. Key 
B. Rhoads and its Progeny's Focus on Causation is Improper for Other Reasons
In addition to running counter to Congressional intent and Supreme Court case law, the Rhoads line of cases' focus on causation is illogical and needlessly injects additional issues of proof into toxic workplace cases under the ADA and Section 504.
Although the Rhoads district court suggested that "the traditional approach found in the ADA for determining whether . . . impairments [caused solely by the workplace environment] are sufficiently severe to be classified as a disability appears inadequate,"" neither that district court decision nor any other post-Rhoads decision has described the nature of the perceived inadequacy of traditional ADA analysis under those circumstances. Likewise, neither the Rhoads courts, nor any other court relying on Rhoads, has given the slightest hint as to why their focus on causation, their refusal to analyze the effect of an impairment on major life activities other than working, and their use of the foreclosure/class-based analysis cures any such unarticulated inadequacy.
For a disability discrimination plaintiff suffering from workplace-induced or -exacerbated asthma or depression, it matters little or not at all whether the impairment was caused inside the workplace, outside the workplace, or both. Whatever the cause of the impairment, the purpose of disability discrimination laws-to allow qualified individuals suffering from impairments to remain in the workplace like their non-disabled co-workers, insofar as their employers have the ability to reasonably accommodate them-applies restrictive reading of the definition of disability and refusing to include episodic or intermittent impairments that otherwise satisfied the requirements of the ADA within the definition of disability. See supra note 34. The statutory changes wrought by the ADAAA do not directly address the above-discussed flaws in Rhoads and its progeny, nor did Congress intend them to do so. However, to the extent that courts, in future decisions, are tempted to rely on Rhoads-inspired jurisprudence to justify a narrow definition of disability, based on an evaluation of causation and application of the foreclosure test when the major life activity impaired is other than working, or to hold, as in Benson and Tyler, that the ADA does not cover employees who are precluded from working at only one worksite-arguably, an episodic impairment-the above-discussed ADAAA provisions will militate against any such reading of the ADA. with equal force. Similarly, looking at the effect of Rhoadsinspired case law on employers, it is both illogical and morethan-a-little ironic that an employer who causes an employee's impairment should be subject to a more employerfavoring standard--one that foregoes analysis of the effect of an impairment on an employee's major life activities other than working, and requires that an employee's impairment precludes or restricts the employee from working in a broad range of jobs, rather than a single job-while an employer who has no causal role in an employee's impairment is subject to the traditional, more rigorous, less employer-favoring ADA and Section 504 analysis.
In addition to logical shortcomings, Rhoads and its progeny's focus on causation results in problems of proof not faced by any other class of ADA and Section 504 claimants. Disability discrimination plaintiffs whose impairments may be caused or exacerbated by conditions in the workplace, unlike any other class of ADA or Section 504 disability discrimination plaintiffs, are required to demonstrate not just the fact, but also the source, of their impairments. Moreover, commentators have rightly pointed out that the cause of physical impairments like asthma or mental impairments such as depression or anxiety-each of which may be caused or exacerbated both inside or outside the workplace-are often difficult to prove with any degree of medical or legal certainty." Thus, under cases governed by the Rhoads line of decisions, but no other class of disability discrimination cases, additional, difficult, and often expensive issues of proof will be added to a disability discrimination plaintiffs burden of proof (and the defendant's rebuttal)-which, even without 744-45 (2004) Though mental illness may be theoretically provable, it likely occurs as a result of some type of brain malfunctioning, and therefore, because we lack the medical technology to verify such malfunctioning during diagnosis, we must often rely solely upon "symptomatology" without "proof" to back it. Further, the source of the illness may be difficult to ascertain, as most mental illnesses are due to varied, and sometimes indirect, causes. Id. Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 605 (1991) (discussing difficulty in proving causation of physical illnesses such as cancer and birth defects in toxic tort cases). causation issues, frequently require both plaintiffs and defendants to retain medical, vocational, and economic or financial experts."
In sum, the Rhoads line of cases' focus on causation defies logic and unwarrantedly injects into the analysis substantial issues of proof not encountered by other disability discrimination plaintiffs.
For these additional reasons, Rhoads and its progeny's focus on causation in toxic workplace cases under the ADA and Section 504 is improper.
C. By Improperly Analyzing the Disability Issue, Rhoads and its Progeny Undercut the ADA and Section 504 by Avoiding the Reasonable Accommodation Issue
As discussed above, when a court determines that a disability discrimination claimant is not disabled under the ADA or Section 504, the court need not, and invariably does not, reach the issue of whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee's impairment.o Thus, under the Rhoads line of cases, a disability discrimination claimant whose impairment is caused or triggered solely by his or her work environment is precluded from demonstrating that his or her impairment substantially affects a major life activity other than working, and may not be able to prove that his or her impairment precludes his or her working from a broad range of jobs under foreclosure or class-based analysis. If so, then the claimant will not be allowed to prove that his or her employer could reasonably accommodate the claimant's disability by providing him or her with a reassignment, job swap, transfer, or an unpaid leave of absence.
For example, in the most typical fact pattern under Rhoads and its progeny-a disability discrimination claimant with a physical impairment such as asthma caused by adverse air quality in the workplace-the employer need not address or correct the adverse condition causing the employee's impairment and caused by the employer itself (unless required to do so by the state or federal occupational safety or environmental laws) by transferring the employee to another worksite, if a position at another site is available." Likewise, under the Rhoads line of cases, an employer who becomes aware that the work environment-in the form of an employee's relationship with a supervisor or co-worker-has caused a disability discrimination claimant to be afflicted with a mental illness, such as clinical depression or anxiety, is under no legal duty to reasonably accommodate the claimant-by (again) either transferring the employee to another job site and, hence, another supervisor or set of coworkers, or providing the employee with a leave of absence so that he or she could obtain psychological or psychiatric treatment to alleviate or remedy the mental illness. 92
91. This outcome works a particularly harsh result in idiosyncratically-toxic workplaces, i.e. where individual employees, but not a larger complement of workers, suffer from a workplace-caused or -exacerbated impairment, since occupational safety or environmental laws will not generally be a source of relief for those individual employees. See Nat'l Realty & Const. Under Rhoads and its progeny and, more generally, under the class-based analysis standard applicable to the major life activity of working, a cruel irony exists. Classbased analysis often prevents a disability discrimination plaintiff from even being considered disabled under the ADA and Section 504, since he or she would not be precluded from performing a broad range of jobs. This result ensues, even though the reasonable accommodation often soughtreassignment or a job transfer-would plausibly allow that same plaintiff to be a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA or Section 504, i.e., perform the essential function of a similar job (with a reasonable accommodation). Again, the inconsistency between this result and the purpose of the ADA and Section 504 is palpable." Moreover, courts, by reversing the trend started in Rhoads-specifically, by jettisoning their improper focus on causation, properly considering the effect of impairments on major life activities other than working, and not defaulting to foreclosure/class-based analysis-would not invariably harm employers' legitimate interests.
In this regard, even if transferring a physically-or mentally-impaired individual to a different position, or term.) Psychotic episodes are not certain to recur, and if they don't the psychosis would not be disabling. Our only point is to distinguish between the nondisabling trigger of a disabling mental illness and the mental illness itself. On the record compiled in the district court, it is not possible to negate the inference that Palmer has in fact a disabling mental illness. 93. Class-based analysis will often prematurely truncate the full ADA/Section 504, disability/qualified, individual/reasonable accommodation analysis, not just in Rhoads and its progeny, but in all cases where working is the only major life activity substantially limited by an impairment. As such, that broader outcome militates in favor of reassessing the validity of class-based analysis in all cases involving the major life activity of working. That reassessment, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
providing that same individual with unpaid leave, would plausibly or likely remedy the workplace-caused impairment, an employer would not have an absolute duty under the ADA or Section 504 to provide such accommodation. Rather, under the reasonable accommodation standard, an otherwise reasonable accommodation such as a job transfer may become unreasonable if a position is not available, 9 4 or if the transfer would displace a more senior employee.1 5 Likewise, an employer may not be required to provide an otherwise reasonable accommodation such as unpaid leave where the leave occurs during an employer's busy season, or where the employer would be forced to hire or schedule additional workers, since providing the leave would be either unreasonable or would work an undue hardship on the employer." Thus, courts, by applying traditional disability discrimination/reasonable accommodation analysis-rather than, as occurred in the Rhoads line of cases, altering the evaluation of the disability and thereby avoiding reasonable accommodation analysis altogether-would adequately protect the legitimate interests of both the disability discrimination claimant and his or her employer.
IV. RHOADS AND ITS PROGENY IN CONTEXT
The judicial decisions in Rhoads and its progeny are symptomatic of the Supreme Court's and lower courts' broader disdain for ADA and Section 504 claims. In particular, the decisions illustrate a well-documented tendency of the Supreme Court and other courts, acting as judicial gatekeepers," to resolve disability discrimination cases in favor of employers at the summary judgment stage by determining that a plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and Section 504." This tendency was most graphically illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, where the Court, rejecting EEOC regulations, held that the determination regarding whether an employee or job applicant was disabled must be determined only after taking into account corrective or mitigating measures available to the individual."
By facilitating dismissal of ADA and Section 504 cases on the threshold question of disabled status at the summary judgment stage, the decisions in Rhoads and its progeny also allow courts to avoid resolving the issue of whether or not an employer failed to fulfill its statutory duty to reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities.
Judicial avoidance of the reasonable accommodation inquiry is consistent with the courts' decisions on the disability question. Indeed, if the Supreme Court and other courts have been reluctant to recognize and protect individuals who are indisputably impaired in one or more major life activities as disabled under the ADA and Section 504-and thereby refuse to force employers to modify their hiring and firing practices vis-A-vis such employees-then it is not at all surprising that those same courts would create and follow a judicial doctrine that allows courts to avoid scrutinizing whether an employer modified its operational practices to accommodate such employees.
From the perspective of courts and employers, if a contrary result on the former question would improperly expand the class of disability discrimination claimants, and would work a significant incursion on employer hiring and firing practices, then a contrary result on the latter question would require courts and juries to evaluate and resolve the factuallyintensive reasonable accommodation issue. 100 This latter result would constitute an exponentially-greater invasion of employer prerogative concerning the day-to-day operation of their business. REV. 642 (2001) . However characterized, and as a matter of perception, if not reality, the redistributive component of the reasonable accommodation requirement has a more intrusive effect on capital expenditures and day-to-day operations of an ADA-covered employer than the antidiscrimination component Yet, properly recognizing disability status under traditional disability discrimination analysis, and giving full play to the ADA and Section 504's reasonable accommodation provisions, are clearly mandated by the stated purposes and express language of the two congressional enactments.1 0 2 Indeed, Congress, by enacting ADAAA provisions calling for a broad construction of the definition of disability and the inclusion of episodic impairments, or impairments in remission when active, within the definition of that term when the requirements of the ADA have been otherwise satisfied, further cements that mandate-at least as to the disability status issue."o0
And, as to the legitimacy of employer prerogative to manage its own internal operations without judicial intrusion, court and employer concerns are more imagined than real: empirical studies have demonstrated that the cost to employers of affording reasonable accommodations are relatively minimal, often requiring no financial outlay and seldom costing over $150. 104 Thus, the Rhoads line of cases constitutes one of the more striking examples of lower courts formulating disability discrimination doctrine that runs counter to law and logic. The resulting application of that doctrine serves judicial and employer interests in avoiding the full application of the ADA and Section 504, thereby disserving the legitimate interests of employees entitled to coverage under those disability discrimination statutes.
CONCLUSION
When work and the workplace itself become a curse, rather than a blessing-specifically, where work or the workplace itself has caused or exacerbated an impairment that substantially limits an employee's major life activities beyond working-courts faced with ADA and Section 504 claims have gone astray. Those courts, by focusing on causation and applying class-based analysis, have fashioned a legal standard that is at odds with congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent, defies logic and raises issues of proof not present in other disability discrimination cases, and improperly short-circuits full disability/reasonable accommodation analysis envisioned by Congress under the ADA and Section 504.
The most recent court of appeals decision addressing this matter has suggested that courts must follow and apply Rhoads and its progeny,os unless and until Congress amends disability discrimination law to require application of what the district court in Rhoads referred to as "the traditional approach found in the ADA;"'o however, such amendment should be wholly unnecessary. Specifically, an amendment is not necessary in light of Congress's clear statement of intent regarding the irrelevance of causation in disability discrimination analysis and recent amendments to the ADA concerning the broad definition of disability and coverage of episodic impairments, as well as the Supreme Court's equally clear circumscription of class-based analysis where impairments substantially limit major life activities other than working.
Thus, unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, Rhoads and its progeny constitute aberrational, judge-made law under circumstances where both Congress and the Supreme Court have already spoken. Also, in contrast to Sutton, Rhoads-inspired case law has not yet migrated to more than a few courts of appeals. As such, unlike Sutton, the fix to the problems created by Rhoads and its progeny should come from other courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, and not from Congress. 106. Rhoads, 956 F. Supp. at 1247; see also supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
